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RIGHT OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
TO CONFRONT SECRET INFORMIERS WHOSE STATEMENTS ARE USED TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
Introduction
The task of apprehending and convicting criminals has become
more and more difficult in recent years. The Supreme Court has
given an increasing amount of protection to criminal defendants
by putting teeth into the provisions of the Federal Constitution,
especially the Fourteenth Amendment. The stand of the Court
is not open to criticism merely because the law has become more
difficult to enforce, but it must be recognized that the determina-
tion of the Court to protect a criminal defendant's rights has creat-
ed problems in certain areas. One area of conflict which has not
yet been brought specifically before the Court is within the com-
prehension of the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
where it is stated that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against
him .... " In their efforts to enforce the law, police officers have
found cause to rely more and more on the statements of secret in-
formers. The problem arises when the criminal defendant insists
on his constitutional right to confront the person who has made
the statement, for if the name of the informer is made public, his
value as a secret informer is forever lost;' and the same or similar
problems arise in cases involving secret government documents.2
The reasons for refusing to disclose secret information are as
many and varied as the cases themselves.3 The two primary rea-
sons, which genetically are one, for refusing confrontation of
secret informers are public policy4 and the protection of the in-
former's value to the police.5 These reasons are in constant conflict
1 See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L. J. 1091 (1951), for a detailed discussion of
paid informers, statutory provisions, etc.
2 See Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy
Security Requirements, 61 HAav. L. REv. 468 (1948).
3 8 WIGmoR, EviDNcE §§ 2367-79 (3d ed. 1940), discusses eight bases
for the claimed privilege of nondisclosure of state secrets.
4 Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884). A statement made privately to
the public prosecutor does not create liability in an action for defamation;
it would contravene public policy.
5 United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629 (D. Wyo. 1930). The court
recognized the value of the informer.
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with the ancient principle of law and justice that allows the ac-
cused the right to confront his accusers. This right was a part of
the common law" and was considered so valuable that it was in-




The right of confrontation is similar to the rule against hearsay
in that it consists primarily in the right of the accused to cross-
examine the witnesses against him, with the secondary and in-
cidental advantage of having the jury observe the demeanor of the
witnesses. To this right there are three notable exceptions: (1)
dying declarations of a deceased are admitted on the trial of a
party charged with his murder;8 (2) testimony given at former
trials,9 and (3) depositions'0  which were subject to cross-
examination, may be admitted when for good reason the witness
cannot be presented to testify at the present trial.
A question arises as to whether a fourth exception exists in cases
where evidence sought to be introduced includes statements of a
secret informer. The relation between the police force and its in-
formers is one of extreme delicacy. The informers have no desire
for public acknowledgment of their services, and if their names
were subject to disclosure, this source of information would be
cut off. In many classes of offenses the use of informers is almost
essential to effective law enforcement," and for this reason pub-
lic policy requires that some privilege or rule of inadmissibility
attach to the identity of informers. In England, the case of Rex v.
Hardy 12 early promulgated such a rule to protect the sources of
information of the police. In the later case of Marks v. Beyfus,1
* 5 WiGmaxo, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1395.
7 5 id. § 1397 n.1 (listing the provisions of each state constitution in-
cluding the right).
8 Campbell v. Georgia, 11 Ga. 353 (1852).
9 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); State v. Heffernan, 24 S.D.
1, 123 N.W. 87 (1909).
:o 5 WiGMoim, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1398.
11 As to the importance attached to secret informers by the federal
government, see Supplement No. 2 to Dep't of Justice Order No. 3229, 11 FED.
REG. 4920 (1946), set forth in 4 MooE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 26.25 [4] n.12
(2d ed. 1950). "Under no circumstances should the name of any confidential
informant be divulged."
12 24 St. Tr. 199, 816 (1794). In an action for .treason, a witness was
asked on cross-examination to whom it was he had furnished information of
the alleged treasonous acts. Objection to the question was sustained on the
ground that public policy protects the channels by which information is con-
veyed to magistrates.
13 25 Q.B.D. 494 (1890).
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the English court reaffirmed the rule but noted a qualification
when it stated that such evidence would be refused only when its
admission was not essential to show the innocence- of the accused.
Until this time, the qualification had not been so clear because
the courts in earlier cases had refused without reservation
to allow a witness to be questioned as to channels of information,
even when the question was asked on cross-examination for the
avowed purpose of testing the credibility of the witness.' 4
Marks v. Beyfus was a civil suit for malicious prosecution. The
plaintiff called the Director of Public Prosecutions as a witness
and asked who it was that gave him the information he acted upon.
Presumably, it was the defendant in the case, but the director re-
fused to answer and the court upheld his refusal on the ground
that the information asked for had been given to the director as a
basis for a public prosecution for a public object, and on grounds
of public policy the identity of the informer should not be dis-
closed. The court stated that even if the director agreed to disclose
the informer's name, the court should refuse to allow it because
except in a situation where the information is necessary to prove
the innocence of the accused, the rule of inadmissibility is not
one of discretion and must be applied.' 5 This statement is prob-
ably only dictum but should be criticized to the extent that it
makes the rule almost absolute. If the rule is really one of public
policy and not one of privilege for the witness, as has been
stated,16 then it would seem that it should allow some discretion in
the trial judge to decide whether it is really necessary in
effectuating the public policy of the state to refuse the evidence.
This is especially true in a civil suit subsequent to a criminal
action in which the secret statements were obviously not those
of a professional informer, and the criminal action was apparently
no more than a malicious attempt to harass and vex the
defendant.' 7
14 Rex v. Hardy, note 12 supra; Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 M. & W.
169, 153 Eng. Rep. 808 (Ex. 1846).
15 Marks v. Beyfus, 25 Q.B.D. 494, 498 (1890).
16 Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 M. & W. 169, 153 Eng. Rep. 808, 809
(Ex. 1846).
'7 A contrary argument suggests that citizens would be less inclined to.
perform their public duty in reporting suspected criminal actions if they
knew their names were going to be subject to disclosure. This argument
is easily refuted. First, it must lie noted from a practical viewpoint that
most persons refuse to report susp~cted 'criminal actions either because
of compassion for the suspected offender, or because of an "I don't care"
attitude, as opposed to a fear of disclosure or possible future prosecution.
In the case of the professional informer, it would seldom occur that a
malicious prosecuti6n suit would follow the criminal action;- the type of
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The rule has been similarly stated as unyielding to discretion
in this country. In Vogel v. Gruazls the leading federal case on
the subject, the plaintiff brought a suit for defamation as a result
of statements made to the state's attorney. In refusing to allow the
state's attorney to reveal what the defendant had said to him, the
Supreme Court stated:
Public policy will protect all such communications, absolutely,
and without reference to the motive or intent of the informer or
the question of probable cause; the ground being, that greater
mischief will probably result from requiring or permitting them
to be disclosed than from wholly rejecting them.1 9
To make the rule one of absolute prohibition of the disclosure
of the informer's identity except in cases where the disclosure
would be necessary to prove the innocence of the criminal de-
fendant- and this necessity could never arise in an action for
malicious prosecution -would be in many cases to change the
machinery of law enforcement into an engine of vexation and
harassment. The better rule in this situation would be to allow the
court to inquire in camera as to the danger involved in disclosure
and make the ultimate decision on admissibility according to the
particular facts of the case.20
17 continued
person about whom the professional informs shys away from such actions.
Secondly, the informer has the protection of the court's discretion. The
basis of its exercise would be the apparent good faith of the accusation -
determined by examining the record at the criminal trial as to any basis for
probable cause that the informer might have had - and the willingness of
the police to disclose the informer's identity. The exercise of the court's dis-
cretion would necessarily include a consideration of the informer's future
safety and possible aid to law enforcement.
18 110 U.S. 311 (1884). The leading state case on this point is Worthington
v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487, 12 Am. Rep. 736 (1872).
19 110 U.S. at 315-16. But see Steen v. First Nat. Bank, 298 Fed. 36
(8th Cir. 1924), where, in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff
asked the prosecuting attorney the name of the person who gave him the
information to start the criminal action against the plaintiff. Upon the
defendant's objection, the court ruled that since the defendant had himself
testified at the preliminary hearing to the conversation between himself and
the prosecuting attorney the privilege of nondisclosure was waived. The
court stated that the privilege was personal and likened it to that of the
attorney-client privilege which could be waived by the client. The court
added that mere silence during testimony disclosing the privileged con-
fidential communication, or any substantial part of it, waives the privilege.
20 In cases involving secret government documents, the courts have
examined the documents to determine their necessity to a proper defense
of the case. See United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal.
1952), aff'd sub nom. Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955),
cert. granted, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). In suits brought by the government, if
the documents are essential items, the court will order their introduction;
[Vol. XXXI
NOTES
The Informer and Probable Cause
The rule is well settled to the effect that where the privilege is
invoked by the Government in a criminal prosecution and the
identity of the informer becomes a material fact in the defense of
the accused, the court will require the disclosure, and if the Gov-
ernment refuses, the witness will be held in contempt, or as an
alternative, his favorable testimony will be barred.21 However,
there are some areas in which the applicability of the rule has been
questioned. In criminal proceedings where the action is based on
evidence obtained during a search without a warrant, the prose-
cution must show reasonable or probable cause for conducting the
search without a warrant,2  and in the federal courts and many
states, the evidence will be excluded if no probable cause was
present.23 Thus, the defendant is constantly striving to convince
the court that the state had no probable cause in order to get the
evidence excluded, and the Government is trying urgently to show
the existence of probable cause without having to reveal the name
or names of its secret informants.
United States v. Blich 2 4 points up the conflict found in probable
cause situations. In that case two federal prohibition agents had
stopped and searched the defendant's car and found it to be carry-
ing liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. The search
was without a warrant. To establish probable cause, one of the
agents testified that a "reliable informant" had advised him that
the defendant at a certain time would be making delivery of intoxi-
cating liquor at a certain designated place on the evening in ques-
tion. The agent relied on this statement as his basis for probable
cause,25 but refused to reveal the name of his informant on the
ground that it would be contrary to the policy of the Prohibition
Department.26 The court ruled that since the testimony of the in-
20 continued
if the order is refused, the court will not admit any testimony based upon
material in the documents. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F-2d 76 (2d Cir.
1944); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
21 Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) (witness cited for
contempt); United States v. Keown, F. Supp. 639 (WD. Ky. 1937)
(indictment dismissed).
22 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
23 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 29 (1948) for a listing of the states
that refused illegally obtained evidence. For recent revisions in the state
alignment, see 31 No=as DA= LAw. 85-88 (1955).
24 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
25 The agent also testified that he had known the defendant previously
as a violator of a municipal liquor ordinance, but the court refused to give
weight to the statement because the previous violation had not involved
transportation.
26 The facts as stated by the court-reveal that after a conference between
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formant was the only basis of probable cause, the Government had
failed to establish reasonable grounds for searching without a
warrant, and the evidence obtained could not be considered.27
The informer's identity was essential so that the court could "...
determine whether, under all the circumstances, such informa-
tion was reliable and the agent was justified in having such be-
lief."28
In Scher v. United States,29 federal officers received confiden-
tial information that a certain automobile would be transporting
illegal whiskey. The officers went to the place specified and there
saw and heard a car being loaded with heavy packages. When a
search was made, without a warrant, the officers found the car
to be loaded with bootleg liquor. In upholding a conviction in
which the name of the informant was not revealed, the Supreme
Court distinguished the Blich case where justification was sought
"because of honest belief based upon credible information. '30 The
legality of the search here was based on what the officers saw and
heard, not the information which caused the defendant to be ob-
served. The Court recognized, however, that where the informer's
identity is essential to the defense, it must be made known.3 '
In Segurola v. United States,3 2 the arresting officer testified that
he had received confidential information that the defendant would
26 continued 1
the district attorney and the Deputy Federal Prohibition Administrator, it
was "elected" that the name of the informant would not be disclosed. There
seems little doubt that the court would have accepted the name of the
informant had it been offered in evidence, thus pointing out the weakness
of the Supreme Court's reasoning when it called the privilege "absolute."
Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 315 (1884).
27 Since law officers are liable in all states to civil suit for an illegal
search, an interesting problem would have arisen if the defendant in the
Blich case had brought suit against the arresting officer. Since the search
would be illegal unless based on probable cause, would the agents be
allowed to reveal the name of their "reliable informant" to protect
themselves from liability? Presumably the Government would be torn
between its policy of preserving the secrecy of its informers and
its interest in protecting its own agents from civil liability.
28 45 F.2d at 629.
- 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
30 United States v. 3lich, 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
3- The recognition was only dictum, since the Court relied on what the
officers saw and heard to establish probable cause, but it is obvious that
the Court considered it a correct statement of the law. The Court went out
of its way to distinguish the Blich case, thus giving tacit approval to the
rule that an informer's statements cannot be used unless the name of the
informer is also disclosed. This is an affirmation of the common law rule
stated in Marks ;v. Bdyjus, note 13 supra.
32 16 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U. S. 106 (1927).
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be illegally transporting liquor, but he refused to give the name
of the informer. The court ruled that an attempt on the part of the
defendant to run away from the officer was sufficient to establish
probable cause for a search without a warrant, and the informer's
name would not have to be revealed. A vigorous dissent, while
recognizing that the name of the informant was privileged and
need not be disclosed by the Government, was based on the ground
that having once revealed the contents of the communication the
Government waived its privilege and the defendant became en-
titled to a full disclosure, including the name of the informant. The
argument of the dissenting judge does no harm to the theory of
the majority. To make the disclosure of any benefit to the defend-
ant the informer's testimony must prove unreliable and the gov-
ernment must be relying on it to establish probable cause, in which
case the majority presumably would also have required the dis-
closure of the informer's name. In that regard, this case follows
the implication of the Scher case 33 and can be construed in har-
mony with the Blich case.a 4
In United States v. Li Fat Tong,3 the defendant was arrested
without a warrant, and federal agents relied on the information
of secret informers to establish probable cause for the arrest. The
defendant sought to suppress the evidence unless the identity of
the informer was disclosed, but the motion was overruled. On ap-
peal, the court made what seems to be a dubious distinction when
it stated that the proof, though based on hearsay, was not from an
"informer," because the arresting agent had gotten the informa-
tion from another agent, although he in turn had received it from
an unidentified informer. But the court took a bolder stand when
it went even further to state:
33 Note 29 supra.
31 The waiver theory of the dissenting justice was used in United
States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd sub nom.
Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S.
858 (1955), a case involving an indictment under the Smith Act, to avoid a
difficult problem. A government witness testified concerning written reports
he had made to the FBI while posing as a Communist party member. The
defendant sought the production of three reports pertaining to party meet-
ings about which the witness testified. The United States Attorney opposed
the motion to produce on the ground the documents contained the names of
confidential informants, and that by virtue of regulations issued by the
Attorney General he was obliged to keep the documents secret. The court
avoided the constitutional issue as to the extent of the Attorney General's
authority~under the regulations by holding that the government waived its
privilege of nondisclosure by adducing evidence touching the subject-mitter
communicated in the reports.
On the theory of waiver, see also Steen v. First Nat. Bank, 298 Fid. 36
(8th Cir. 1924).
35 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).-
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There is no reason to suppose that hearsay evidence derived from
an informer is not as competent evidence on which to show probable
cause for an arrest as any other proof. The weight to be given it is
a matter for the sound discretion of the court which was exercised
on the motion to suppress. 3 6
The court's theory was that public policy dictated that the names
of secret informers were not to be disclosed unless necessary to
show the innocence of the defendant. Since the defendant here
was obviously guilty- he was carrying narcotics when arrested
- the names of the secret informers would not prove the de-
fendant's innocence.
This theory is out of harmony with the decision in United States
v. Blich3 7 and would seem to be a misapplication of the rules laid
down in the Scher case3 8 and Carroll v. United States.3 9 The court
states that that hearsay evidence is sufficient to establish probable
cause for arrest, and that is unquestionably a correct statement
of the law.40 The court missed the point, however, on the question
of what characteristics hearsay evidence should possess when it
refused to require the Government to show the reliability of the
hearsay. The court refused to admit the names of the informers
because the admission could not prove the defendant's innocence,
but if the defendant had not been carrying narcotics and the of-
ficers' reliance on the statements had not- been borne out, would
the court admit the names of the informers to discover whether
the officers had reasonable grounds for relying on their state-
ments? Basing the answer on reasonable implications from the
court's opinion in the case, it would be "yes." But this would be
allowing the end to justify the means, and does not square with a
correct statement of the law.
4 1
36 152 F.2d at 652.
37 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
as 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
39 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
40 Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (where the information
of a secret informer was used to establish probable cause). It should be
noted that in the Husty case the Court refused to consider defendant's
assignment of error as to nondisclosure of the informer's name because the
question was not raised on the appeal to the court of appeals. The Court gave
no indication as to what its decision would have been had it considered the
question.
41 "An unlawful search cannot be justified by what is found." United
States v. Slusser, 270 Fed. 818, 819 (S.D. Ohio 1921). It must be noted that
most state courts still admit illegally obtained evidence, see 31 NoRE DAME
LAw. 85 (1955), leaving the defendant to seek his remedy in a civil suit
against the officer making the illegal search. But the federal courts do not
admit such evidence, and this would make the existence of a proper basis
for probable cause an extremely important matter. If evidence is illegally
[Vol. XXXI
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In United States v. Nichols, 4- the defendant had protested
against the admission of statements of an informer to establish
probable cause without at the same time disclosing the name of
the informer. The defendant put forth the argument that,
... since the backbone of the probable cause is the "tip", he is
entitled to have the informer identified, in order that he may show,
if possible, that the informer was unreliable or unworthy of belief,
and if successful in this regard, he contends that the officers
would not be justified in relying upon the "tip", and therefore
would not have probable cause for the search.
43
The court, however, overruled the objection on the ground that,
. . the defendant did not allege that it was his belief that the officer
was testifying falsely as to having received the information, or that
a disclosure of the informer's identity was essential to his defense
on the merits of the case, as necessary or desirable to show his
innocence of the charge against him 4
Apparently, the court was giving but lip service to the principle
that the informer's identity must be revealed to establish probable
cause by requiring a direct allegation by defendant that disclosure
was necessary to show his innocence before the Government
would be forced to make disclosure. The case is capable of
being squared with United States v. Blich.4 5 However, the
argument of the court seems almost as spurious as that of
the Second Circuit in distinguishing between an informer's
testimony received directly by the arresting officer and that
received by another agent and passed on to the arresting
officer.46 The requirement stated by the court here is tantamount
to saying that the prosecution need not bother to establish prob-
able cause unless the defendant alleges such proof is essential to
his defense, and a mere objection to the admission of evidence
obtained in a search not based on probable cause is not a substi-
tute for that allegation.4 7
Conclusion
The courts are obviously not in harmony as to the competence
41- continued
obtained, defendants, while not innocent in fact, cannot be proven guilty
with that evidence in the federal courts. The Second Circuit is attempting
to evade this rule of inadmissibility in the Li Fat Tong case.
42 78 F. Supp. 483 (W.D. Ark. 1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1949).
43 Id. at 487.
44 bid.
45 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930).
46 United States v. Li Fat Tong, note 35 supra.
47 See Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946), rehearing on
motion for cert. denied, 331 US. 863 (1949), which holds to the same effect.
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of the statements of an informer when they are relied upon to
establish probable cause and the name of the informer is not dis-
closed. The Supreme Court has twice avoided the issue,48 and,
in addition to the cases discussed above, many other cases can be
found as apparent authority on both sides of the issue.4 9 There
is agreement among all the courts, however, with the basic rule
that the criminal defendant is entitled to know the informer and
even call him to the stand when it is necessary to prove the defend-
ant's innocence; and when the rule collides with the policy of
keeping the informer's name secret, the individual's right to show
his innocence must prevail, either by requiring disclosure or by
refusing to admit the evidence obtained through use of the in-
former's statement. The conflict exists only as to the application
of the rule in probable cause situations. The courts which would
not require disclosure are apparently motivated by the argument
that if the defendant is obviously guilty, why should the govern-
ment be forced to choose between revealing the names of its
trusted informers, and letting the guilty go free. To support their
refusal to require disclosure, some of these courts cite United
States v. Scher50 as declaratory of the rule that the policy is un-
bending and disclosure is absolutely prohibitedP.~
Since the courts apparently would not give credence to the in-
former's statement if the person protesting its admission is not
obviously guilty, the courts who adopt the theory are in effect
using two different rules of law, one for the guilty and another
for the innocent. In addition, such a rule plays havoc with a liberal
construction of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion, which requires probable cause for a search and the evidence
to prove it.
48 Husty v. .United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Segurola v. United States,
275 U.S. 106 (1927).
49 Courts which would apparently not require disclosure: McInes v.
United States, 62 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 616 (1933);
Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285
U.S. 552 (1932); Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930); United
States v. Rogers, 53 F.2d 874, 876 (D.N.J. 1931), aff'd sub nom. Burkis v.
United States, 60 F.2d 452 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 655 (1932).
Courts which would apparently require disclosure to admit the evidence:
Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Keown,
19 F. Supp. 639, 645-46 (W.D. Ky. 1937); People v. Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379,
118 N.E.2d 566 (1954).
50 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
51 Notably the Nichols case on appeal to the Eighth Circuit. 176 F.2d 431,
(8th Cir. 1949). This is not only a compromise of the basic rule but also a
misinterpretation of the Scher case, note .50 supra, and a misapplication of
the .common law rule. See Marks v. Beyfs, note 13 supra.
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The argument of these courts is well answered in United States
v. Blich:
It is scarcely an answer to the proposition that an agent testifies
that his informant was a reliable person, and that he believed the
information so given, unless the court sitting in judgment may have
the right to determine whether, under all the circumstances, such
information was reliable and the agent was justified in having such
belief. A belief must -or should rest upon a substantial basis. It is
not a question of impugning the motives or doubting the honest
belief of the agent in regard to the information which he may have
received. It is simply requiring the witness to sustain his motives
and his beliefs by all the evidence at his command. It is con-
ceivable that a prohibition agent in the earnestness and eagerness
of performing his duty might adopt very shadowy leads. But what
is of greater consequence is that an ill-intentioned person might give
an officer information which would in many instances lead to
humiliation and vexation of the innocent automobile driver upon
the public highway, and yet, with the failure to disclose the name
of his informant, the prohibition agent would be safely ensconced
behind his blanket testimony that he was informed by a reliable
person.52
The better rule is to require universal disclosure of the names
of informants when their statements are made the basis for estab-
lishing probable cause. This would give law enforcement officers
a concrete rule on which to act and would coincide with the pro-
tections of the Constitution against unreasonable search. Where
the defendant is found to be breaking the law, but the Government
needs the statements of an informer to establish probable cause,
it must weigh the future value of the informer's secret identity
against the desirability of obtaining a conviction. If the informer's
identity weighs heavier, and the Government refuses to disclose
his identity, the case should be dismissed.
But under practical considerations, it would be a most unusual
situation when the statement of an informer is an absolute es-
sential. The Government should take its cue from the Supreme
Court in United States v. Scher,53 and where such secret informa-
tion is received, the Government officers need only delay an arrest
or search long enough to detect with their own eyes sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause. The statements will then be
unnecessary to the prosecution, and the informer will have served
his valuable purpose of helping to detect and convict criminals.
Edward J. Griffin
52 45 F2d at 629.
5 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
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